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In this paper we investigate which individuals face difficulties in raising funds from financial 
institutions when starting a business. We argue that banks are more likely to provide financial 
funds the more they are convinced that the loan is repaid timely and the business is likely to 
succeed. Thus, potential business founders can increase their chance to obtain a bank loan by 
committing themselves to repayment and their new business. Further, they can signal to the 
bank that they are good lenders. Our empirical analysis proceeds in two steps reflecting the 
supply and demand side of the market for business loans. First, we estimate the denial rate of 
banks and then we also look whether potential business founders differ in their likelihood to 
apply for credit. Our main findings are that home ownership, experience obtained in previous 
jobs, education, family composition, nationality, parental self-employment, multiple-
ownership and income derived from previous occupation affect access to external financial 
resources. We argue that business plans and support obtained from an accountant are effective 
ways to signal credibility to a bank.  
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 1 
Introduction 
 
Banks hesitate to lend funds to businesses in general and small enterprises in particular.1 Ang 
(1991, 1992) discusses the extent of capital market imperfections in the context of small 
establishments and observes that in judging credit applications banks face several serious 
information problems. First, as usual the applicant’s information concerning the prospects of 
the project is usually better than that of outsiders. Information asymmetries may be substantial 
in the context of small businesses because of the relatively high fixed cost of gathering 
information the bank incurs for a small transaction. Furthermore the smaller number of 
repeated transactions; the smaller incentives of outside analysts to collect information; and the 
fewer instruments available to small businesses to signal their credibility yield conditions 
under which serious information asymmetries prevail. Second, the quality of the data 
provided by small business owners for review by stakeholders like banks is often poor due to 
a lack of management experience or staff to produce useful information. Ang (1991, 1992) 
notes that an advantage of small businesses is that the managers are often the owners as well. 
This feature may resolve the manager versus ownership problem. However, he also argues 
that conflicts of interest between the owner and other stakeholders, like suppliers exercising 
monopoly power, may be more serious. For all these reasons it is not surprising that banks 
hesitate to provide loans to businesses and seek protection by requiring collateral. Therefore, 
any business owner seeking bank financing needs to overcome the hesitation and doubts of 
banks. This paper investigates how commitments and signals are means for a potential 
business founder to convince a bank providing a loan. 
  
The motivation for this research stems from the fact that entrepreneurial activity is hampered 
by limited access to financial resources. The evidence of capital market imperfections in the 
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context of starting businesses is widespread. For instance, Evans and Jovanovic (1989) report 
that personal wealth facilitates an individual’s possibility to become self-employed. Likewise, 
the receipt of an inheritance or other windfall gains raises the probability of entering self-
employment (Holtz-Eakin et al., 1994a, 1994b ; Lindh and Ohlsson, 1996; Blanchflower and 
Oswald, 1998). Finally, Black et al. (1996) argue that supply of collateral due to home 
ownership enhances the formation of new firms. So far very little is known about the 
characteristics of individuals who would like to start a business, but are restricted in doing so 
because of limited access to external financial resources. This paper intends to provide some 
insight into this issue.  In fact, we analyze data collected among 1163 individuals living in the 
Southern part of Limburg (The Netherlands) who considered becoming self-employed in 1998 
and 1999. For starting their business 347 of them required additional external funds and 
applied for capital provided by a bank. The survey provides information about whether these 
individuals made an application at a bank and it indicates to which extent these applications 
have been granted. In addition it informs about education, work experience and social 
background of the potential business founders. An interesting feature of the data we consider 
is that it provides information about a number of commitments and signals an applicant may 
give to enhance the credibility of the project. In particular, we observe whether an applicant 
has written a business plan or has consulted an accountant when applying for credit. Since 
these two activities are costly commitments of own resources, they may reveal that the 
applicant’s expectations about the profitability of the project are high. This idea is in line with 
insights obtained from the literature on signaling games, where in equilibrium costly 
messages reveal the type of the sender (Myers and Majluf, 1984; Gibbons, 1992). We 
investigate whether applications supported by these signals are more likely to be approved. 
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The paper proceeds as follows. In section 1 a model is developed by which we can identify 
the characteristics of individuals who are more likely to face financial constraints. This model 
determines the probability that an individual is constrained in terms of receiving financial 
resources from a bank. In section 2 we provide an overview of the empirical and theoretical 
literature that is relevant to our subject. Section 3 describes the data we analyze. We estimate 
a logit model that relates the probability of experiencing financing constraints to a set of 
variables we observe. The results are depicted in section 4. In case loan applications are 
costly, some individuals may not apply because they fear this effort will be unsuccessful 
anyway. Such individuals might also be regarded as constrained. Therefore, we also present 
some results we obtain from estimating a logit model, which explains the probability that an 
individual applies for credit at a bank. This exercise provides some further insight into the 
characteristics of individuals who experience financial obstacles to start their own business. 
Finally, section 5 provides a conclusion.  
 
I. The identification of liquidity constrained individuals  
 
In order to determine which individuals are more likely to experience limited access to funds 
provided by financial institutions we adopt an approach developed by Jappelli (1990). He 
argues that to assess whether an individual is rationed one must take account of the demand 
and supply for capital. More formally, suppose that in the absence of any borrowing 
constraints K* denotes the optimal amount of capital the individual wants to invest if he or she 
becomes self-employed. The stock of non-human wealth is denoted by A. The parameter D 
measures the amount of credit obtained. We define an individual to be liquidity constrained if  
 
(1) DAK >−*  
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This equation indicates that liquidity constraints appear if the individual’s resources, A, are 
insufficient to purchase K* and if the banks are reluctant to lend money, i.e. when D is small.  
 
To proceed with this framework it would be desirable to derive K* from some optimization 
problem faced by the business founder. However, this requires the optimization of a dynamic 
model of factor demand.2 Usually these models are very complicated and it is often difficult 
and sometimes impossible to solve for the optimal amount of factor inputs (Hamermesh and 
Pfann, p. 1274, 1996).3 In our framework this observation implies that it is not straightforward 
to deliver a closed form solution for K*. Therefore, we assume that the demand for funds, 
which is given by the difference between the desired stock of capital and non-human wealth, 
can be approximated by εα +=− XAK * . The matrix X contains variables like age, 
education, work experience, social background etc.4  represents a parameter vector and  is 
stochastic. 
 
In the context of capital market imperfections, banks may be reluctant to lend money (Ang, 
1991, 1992). Due to agency costs and asymmetric information the size of D may be 
insufficient to cover AK −* . Hence, for some individuals who intend to start a business 
equation (1) will hold. The supply of funds is given by the debt ceiling D, which is presumed 
to be a linear function of the same variables: νδ += XD .  is a vector of parameters and the 
term  is random. It follows that (1) can be restated as 
 
(2) 0>+ µβX  
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where δαβ −= and νεµ −= . The expression  approximates the excess demand for 
capital from banks. We like to mentio   	
     	  
account for the notion that some variables affect demand but not the supply of funds for 
instance. However, because of the reduced form nature of the above model it is not possible to 
 rately. The dummy variable Z indicates whether an individual is credit 
constrained or not. We assume that if he or she does not receive the full grant and hence 
experiences difficulties raising sufficient funds from banks to purchase the desired stock of 
capital, then Z=1 and 0>+ µβX . Otherwise Z=0.5 The stochastic nature of equation (2) 
allows us to derive the probability that an individual experiences credit constraints: 
( )βXFZ == )1Pr(  where F is assumed to be the logistic distribution function.  
 
II. A closer inspection of credit denial and application 
 
Commitments and signals as means to reduce information asymmetries and agency costs 
The vast majority of small firms and business start-ups relies on commercial banks for 
obtaining additional financial funds (see, e.g., Keasey & Watson 1992). Equity financing is 
hardly a viable alternative, because the equity market for small firms is not well developed, 
most entrepreneurs lack the experience and expertise to obtain equity financing and raising 
equity is rather costly and therefore inefficient for smaller financing volumes. Although bank 
loans are the most widely used form of small and new business financing, the exchange 
relation between banks and their small business clients often suffers from market 
imperfections, such as agency costs and information asymmetry. Banks are unable to assess 
the credit risks of a venture well and the business starters’ assessment of their ventures suffers 
from an ‘optimistic’ bias. Especially in markets where it is difficult to distinguish between 
good and bad credit risks, these capital market imperfections result in a supply shortage of 
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financial funds. Some new ventures with positive net present value cannot attract the 
necessary financial funding, because banks ask for high risk premiums and ration credit 
(Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981). Banks are more likely to approve a credit request at reasonable 
terms, if the bank is convinced that the business is likely to succeed or if the bank is able to 
collect the debt, even if the proposed venture fails. Credible commitments and signals on part 
of the business starter are mechanisms enhancing the chance to collect the debt and the bank’s 
ability to assess the success chance of the venture. Thus, business starters can increase their 
possibilities to obtain the required financial funds by giving such credible commitments and 
signals (Avery et al. 1998). 
 
Figure 1 shows how credible commitments and signals mitigate the bank’s fear to invest in a 
venture with negative net present value and to loose the provided debt. In terms of our model 
introduced in section 1, each cell of figure 1 refers to a broad category of explanatory 
variables collected in the matrix X. In the following, we will work out the cell entries of the 
figures starting with the upper left cell and proceeding clock-wise. Credible commitments 
guaranteeing the repayment of the debt even if the business fails are linked to collaterals 
underlying the loan. Such collaterals, i.e. the private wealth of a business starter as well as re-
deployable assets of the firm, like e.g. buildings and machinery, reduce the bank’s exposure to 
loosing the debt (Keasey & Watson 2000). Evidence in favor of this conjecture is provided by 
related studies, which show that the chance to obtain credit is significantly increased by 
collateral commitments, such as home ownership (Black et al., 1996) and investments in 
buildings and machinery (Levenson & Willard 2000).  
 
Next to collateral, the earning capacity of a business starter in a subsequent job, i.e. the job 
after the eventual failure of the business, is a signal to the bank, whether the business starter 
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can meet his credit obligations even if the business fails. Young and highly educated business 
starters are more likely to have a high post-failure earning capacity than older and less 
educated people. The income that a business starter earned previously, is another indicator, 
which signals the earning capacity after an eventual failure.  
 
*** Insert Figure 1 about here *** 
 
Although banks care about debt-repayment, their primary objective is to allocate their funds 
to successful ventures (see last row of figure 1), because they profit much more from a long-
term relation with a new business that grows to an established firm (Storey 1993). Banks are 
seeking promising new business proposals, whose risks they can evaluate well. Thus, business 
starters need to convince banks that their proposals are promising and can be assessed well. 
The broad literature on successful business start-ups offers an insight on, which factors serve 
as a signal for new business success. Several studies show that the founder’s career affects the 
success of the new business (Brüderl, Preisendorfer & Ziegler 1992; Gimeno et al. 1997; van 
Praag 1996). Further, demographic characteristics and the social background of the business 
starter are related to success. Married persons are more likely to become successful 
entrepreneurs, because their spouses offer them additional financial and emotional support. 
Further, spouses often work as a relatively cheap and very reliable ‘employee’ in the new 
business or they hold a paid job, which eases the liquidity of the entrepreneur’s household and 
allows re-investing more earnings into the business.6 Children require care, money, effort and 
time, which cannot be invested in the newly founded business. As a consequence, individuals 
who are responsible for children had and have little opportunities to spare resources for their 
business and are less likely to succeed. In the US, a number of studies have shown that access 
to bank financing is more difficult for ethnic minorities (Bates, 1991; Munell et al. 1996; 
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Blanchflower et al., 1998; Cavalluzzo & Cavalluzzo, 1998). Discrimination on ethnic 
background is one possible explanation for these results (Blanchflower et al., 1998). 
However, most studies on this issue observe that it is also possible that ethnic background is 
correlated with other characteristics, such as personal wealth, education, credit history etc., 
that banks consider relevant in the determination of the business success chances. This 
implies that if a researcher does not measure such variables satisfactorily, then ethnicity is 
likely to be a significant explanatory variable of bank decisions, because it takes account of 
the effects of omitted variables. Therefore, one should be cautious in the interpretation of the 
effects of ethnic background.  
 
We also explore whether multiple ownership facilitates access to bank loans. On the one hand 
banks may be reluctant to provide financial support due to complex agency problems if more 
parties are involved in the financing of a business. Then coordination and agency problems 
are larger (Ang, 1991). On the other hand multiple ownership reveals that the business 
founder was able to convince others to invest in his business. This could be an important 
signal for the bank and reduces the uncertainty of the creditor. Furthermore, many individuals 
liable for the underlying loan reduce the bank’s risk in case of bankruptcy. These observations 
indicate that it is difficult to predict a priori whether banks appreciate the presence of other 
parties, who already committed their resources to a new business venture. Hence, the 
empirical analysis has to resolve this issue.  
   
The reluctance of banks to provide credit for business start-ups is also influenced by the 
difficulties to assess a new business. From the bank’s perspective information provided by the 
entrepreneur is less reliable, because the entrepreneur has a self-interest in exaggerating the 
success chances of his business. Entrepreneurs can diminish this reluctance with 
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commitments increasing the credibility of their credit application (Ang, 1991). Entrepreneurs 
can improve the decision basis of banks by providing more detailed and more reliable 
information by writing a business plan for instance. Especially if the financial plan of the 
venture is designed with the support of an accountant and if an accountant approves of it, 
banks may be more willing to grant a loan. The provision of such better information is costly 
for the entrepreneur and thus he has to commit own resources before a decision on the credit 
application has been taken. The fact that the entrepreneur incurs costs to convince the bank of 
the worthiness of the credit application with better and more reliable information should give 
the bank also more faith in the success potential of the business idea. The extent to which a 
business founder commits own resources to the venture also signals to the banks that they are 
investing in a serious business idea. Own investments are a credible commitment mitigating 
the principal agent conflict between stockholders and bondholders, because the more own 
money business starters invest, the less likely it is that they take on very risky investments.7 
 
In general, we expect that the approval chance of credit application increases with the amount 
as well as the credibility of the commitments and signals an entrepreneur places to convince 
the bank that she or he is a reliable person pursuing a business idea with good success 
chances. Here, it should be noted that financing of new businesses can solely be based on the 
assessment of a person, the potential business founder, and a blueprint of an idea, since past 
financial records do not exist. Thus, characteristics of the entrepreneur will play an even more 
crucial role. 
 
Interplay between denial and application rates 
In the previous sections we provided arguments to explain the chance that a bank approves a 
credit application and focused on the supply side of the market for new business financing. 
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However, business starters – even those with very promising business ideas – may not apply 
for credit because they expect their efforts to be unsuccessful anyway. Especially if the cost 
for a credit application is substantial and the probability of being rejected is high, it may be 
optimal not to apply. Therefore, our analysis of the financing denial is likely to be biased 
towards finding a too small incidence of being denied regarding a number of variables (cf. 
Blanchflower et al., 1998). One could solve this problem by estimating a model that takes into 
account the application process and the outcome of the application simultaneously. However, 
such a Heckman correction approach requires a variable that is correlated with the 
individual’s decision to apply, but does not affect the bank’s decision to approve the loan or 
not. Such variables are very rare and the dataset we use in our empirical part does not provide 
it. Therefore we follow the approach suggested by Cavalluzzo and Cavalluzo (1998) who 
estimate a sequential response model in which the application and denial decision are treated 
as if they were independent (see Maddala, p. 49, 1983). In fact this allows us to analyze the 
two decisions separately. Of course the independence assumption is a rough one. However, 
we make it since it facilitates us to get some additional and useful insights into the 
determinants of capital market restraints.  
 
Like the denial decision, we estimate the application equation using a logit model and 
consider the same explanatory variables. This can be explained as follows. An individual 
bases his or her decision to apply on the chance of a successful application, the utility derived 
from receiving a loan and the cost of applying. In the previous section, we argued that the 
availability of collaterals and the perceived success chances of a business reduce the chance 
that a bank denies a loan request. Thus, business starters that can provide the required 
collateral are more likely to ask for a bank credit, because their higher chance of credit 
approval justifies incurring the costs associated with a credit application. In addition, potential 
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entrepreneurs, who believe that they are able to repay a debt even if their business idea fails, 
are also more likely to apply for credit, because a failure of their business will not disrupt 
their personal finances critically for a long time. Likewise, higher perceived success chances 
will convince a potential entrepreneur to seriously pursue his business idea and to apply for 
bank financing. First, the higher success chance increases the chance that a credit proposal 
will be approved and thus the preparation costs for the proposal are more justified. Second, 
business with higher success chance have by definition a lower failure chance. Thus, the 
entrepreneur’s risk to end up in personal financial distress in case of a business failure is 
lower. In our data set there are no variables measuring differences in application costs. 
Furthermore, we lack information about how financial funds obtained from banks affect a 
business founder’s utility. Hence, we will consider the same explanatory variables for both the 
application and denial model.  
 
III. Research design: Used data and information 
 
The estimation of the model is based on a survey that has been conducted among individuals 
living in the Southern part of Limburg, a Dutch province. This dataset is based on computer 
assisted personal interviews (CAPI) with 1223 respondents, who intended to start a business 
in 1998 or 1999. 994 of the respondents started a business while 229 refrained from their 
original idea to become an entrepreneur (see Blumberg & Pfann 2002 for further information 
on the survey). Due to partial item non-response we work with a total sample of 1163 
respondents to analyze the application rate. Our sample for the analysis of the denial rates is 
based on a sub-sample of those 347 respondents, who applied for credit at a bank. 
Approximately 30% of these applications were denied full approval. During the interviews, 
all respondents provided extensive information on their educational and occupational career, 
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their social background, their spouse, available financial capital, the founding process and the 
started business. 
 
In our theoretical part, we linked the application- and denial rates to the entrepreneurs’ 
possibilities to give credible commitments and signals. Our data do not provide direct 
measurements of such commitments and signals. Rather, we use variables, which can serve as 
reliable indicators for our theoretical constructs. Figure 2 shows which indicators are used to 
measure the different commitments and signals (see appendix I for relevant descriptives of the 
used variables). The available collateral is measured with the dummy variable home 
ownership, which equals one, if the respondent possesses a house and zero otherwise. 
Higher post-failure earning capacities are positively related to the variables age, high 
education and previous income. Age is measured in years, high education is 
measured with a dummy variable, which takes the value one if the respondent has completed 
higher vocational training or university. Previous income is proxied by the last year 
income the respondent earned and included in our analyses with four dummy variables, each 
representing an income spread of HFL8 25000 with income below HFL 25000 as reference 
category. Several variables concerning the previous occupational career as well as the 
demographics of the potential business starter are used to assess the success chances of the 
business. The variables leadership, previous self-employment and job 
similarity reflect the occupational career of the respondent. The former two variables are 
dummy variables that take the value one if the respondent has gained leadership experience in 
former jobs and has previously been self-employed, respectively. They equal zero otherwise. 
The variable job similarity measures to what extent his tasks as a self-employed are 
similar to the ones he performed in his previous job based on the respondent’s assessment. 
The demographics of the respondents are described by parental self-employment, 
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married, children and foreign. All variables are dummy variables, which take the 
value one if the respondent’s parents have ever been self-employed, the respondent is married, 
the respondent has children and the respondent is born abroad, respectively. They are equal to 
zero otherwise. 
 
*** Insert figure 2 about here *** 
 
Signals helping a bank to improve it’s own assessment of a business proposal are measured 
with the variables business plan and accountant. A business plan provides the bank 
with additional information on the proposed venture and thereby enlarges the bank’s 
information basis. Business and financial plans that are designed with the aid of an 
accountant, who has to comply with certain legal and professional standards, enrich the 
information basis of a bank, because they are less biased. Further, we use ‘multiple 
ownership’ as an indicator for another signal about the promising qualities of the new 
venture.  
 
IV. Empirical analysis of denial and application chances 
 
Chances of credit approval 
In this section we study which individuals are more likely to experience limited access to 
financial resources supplied by banks by estimating the model we presented in section two. In 
table 1 we depict the estimation results. It indicates under which circumstances a bank is more 
likely to deny an application. We find that denial is less likely to occur if the applicant owns a 
house. Credible commitments with respect to the recollection chances of a debt increase the 
chance that a bank grants a credit. Previous income, high education and age signal the chance 
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to recollect the debt - even if the business fails – from later income streams of the respondent. 
The coefficients of the variables high education and previous income are all not 
significant. Thus, banks do not consider the post-failure earning capacity in their decision. 
The variables age and age squared are also not significant, suggesting that banks do not 
account for differences in life time horizons when deciding on a credit application.  
 
ABOUT HERE TABLE 1 
 
All other variables in table 1 refer to commitments and signals concerning the success chance 
of a new business venture. With respect to commitments, we note that if the applicant shows 
faith in this business idea by committing own resources, banks are more likely to approve a 
credit application. In this study we investigated the writing of a business plan and the 
consultation of an accountant and find that both commitments reduce the incidence of loan 
denial. Apparently, applicants show their credibility to banks employing these commitments. 
As a consequence such applications are subject to less uncertainty and the bank is more likely 
to grant the application.9 Signals related to the success chances of the business have mixed 
results. The significant effect of the variable job similarity suggests that banks also tend to 
appreciate whether an applicant has performed a job previously of which the tasks are similar 
to the tasks that need to be performed when being self-employed. The presence of such 
specific human capital seems to be valued positively by banks. Surprisingly, the two variables 
previously self-employed and parental self-employment, which are directly related to specific 
human capital in the form of entrepreneurial skills do not have an effect. The coefficient of 
previously self-employed is not significantly different from zero. Though our data do not 
indicate whether an individual operated a business that went bankrupt previously, this finding 
could be in line with the notion, that in Europe contrary to the US unsuccessful attempts to 
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start a business are regarded as an indicator for missing entrepreneurial qualities and not as a 
valuable experience.  
 
Applicants who were born abroad or who have children are less likely to receive a full grant. 
Since we do not measure personal wealth very well in our data, the findings regarding ethnic 
background and family composition might reflect differences in wealth. We argued before 
that the presence of children might measure the lower capacity of such households to 
accumulate wealth fast, because of a higher level of consumption. The presence of children 
may also reduce time and financial resources available to conduct the newly founded business 
in a decent way. Individuals born abroad may have had little opportunities to save some funds 
and acquire wealth. We like to stress again that we cannot conclude that banks discriminate 
by race due to lack of sufficient data. It appears that applicants who intend to remain the 
single owner of the establishment are more likely to face financing constraints. Banks are 
slightly more likely to refute their request for funds since they are less likely to be able to be 
refunded in case of bankruptcy if the owner remains single and because multiple-ownership 
may signal a higher degree of credibility of the application. Apparently our results indicate 
that banks do not care much about the increased complexity of the agency problem in case of 
multiple-ownership. By and large, our analysis shows that indicators related to commitments 
have the expected effects while the indicators describing different signals show mixed and 
ambiguous results. 
 
Estimates of application rates 
Since the act of acquiring a loan is costly some individuals may be reluctant to apply. Hence, 
the findings above are likely to relate to applicants who expect to be successful in receiving a 
loan. We now turn to the question: “Who applies?”. We present results in table 2. In the 
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previous section we found that home ownership, the presence of a business plan, the support 
of an accountant and having a business partner decrease the likelihood that a loan is being 
denied. In line with this finding table 2 reports that these four variables increase the likelihood 
that an individual applies for a loan. Apparently in these instances the lower probability of 
being denied increases the incentive to apply.  
 
ABOUT HERE TABLE 2 
 
Though job similarity, presence of children and being born abroad did affect the probability of 
loan denial, it appears that these features do not influence the individual’s incentive to apply. 
This may indicate that the effect on the probability of denial of these variables is small. As a 
consequence these variables may hardly affect the individual’s decisions to apply or not.  
 
Finally, a number of variables affect the decision to apply, but do not influence the probability 
of being denied. In fact, we find that a higher degree of education, the presence of self-
employed parents, and higher levels of income in jobs occupied prior to the decision to 
become self-employed, increase the probability of a loan application. The selection effect 
seems rather strong regarding these variables. As a consequence, we observe that individuals 
not satisfying these features do not apply for a loan, which could explain why we do not find 
significant effects regarding these variables in the loan denial model.10  
 
V Conclusion 
 
The question we address in this paper is: “Who experiences limited access to funds from 
banks when starting a business?”  We have conducted our analysis in two distinct steps. First, 
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we have estimated a model that determines which features determine whether an application 
is fully granted or not by a financial institution. Secondly, we have estimated a model that 
explains which individuals apply for a loan. It is important to undertake this empirical 
exercise as well since some individuals may not apply for a loan since they expect to be 
unsuccessful. If applying for a loan is rather costly they will abstain from undertaking this 
effort. Such persons should be regarded as financially constrained as well.  
 
We argued that a bank’s decision to approve or deny a credit application depends on 
commitments and signals by the potential entrepreneur showing the bank that the new 
venture’s success is likely and repayment of the debt is highly probable. In line with Black et 
al. (1996) we find that home ownership is important to acquire access to external financial 
resources. They find that many potential entrepreneurs who are at least as able as many of 
those who actually enter self-employment are prevented from starting because of a lack of 
collateral. To be able to invest in activities people regard worthwhile for which they require a 
loan from a bank individuals should be stimulated to build up property, which may be 
collateralized. Obviously, this provides an argument in favor of government policies directed 
towards households investing in housing assets. The question whether mortgage interest 
payments need to remain deductible from income taxes receives a lot of attention in public 
media and the political debate. Our results and those of Black et al. (1996) provide a strong 
rationale for at least some type of subsidies on housing assets. Furthermore, the high 
importance of collaterals suggests that state sureties for very promising business ideas of less 
wealthy individuals can foster self-employment and mitigate imperfections of the financial 
market. Education and previous income do only affect the chance to apply for credit but not 
the chance of credit denial. This result leans for two interpretations. Either, banks 
communicate their borrowing policy efficiently to potential entrepreneurs and people with 
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low (previous) earning capacity self-select and do not apply for a bank loan or banks fail to 
approach individuals with a lower education and a low income, although some of these 
individuals have promising business ideas. 
 
Writing a business plan and the support of an accountant enhance the credibility of a loan 
application. Apparently, small financial commitments, i.e. the incurred costs for writing a 
business plan and hiring an accountant, convince banks. Empirical studies on the survival of 
new businesses show that work experience, previous self-employment and leadership 
experience are positively related to success (see, e.g., Brüderl, Preisendörfer & Ziegler 1992; 
Gimeno e.a. 1997; van Praag 1996). Our analysis suggests that banks appreciate if a potential 
business founder has gained relevant similar experience in a paid job, but are reluctant to 
value previous self-employment.  The presence of children and being born abroad lowers the 
probability of a full grant. We stress that we do not conclude that banks discriminate by race. 
Since our data lack sufficient information on personal wealth our control for ethnic 
background may reflect differences in financial assets. Individuals who intend to remain the 
sole owner of the establishment are more likely to experience difficulties in receiving a full 
grant. Therefore, to enhance one’s prospects of receiving funds form financial institutions 
entrepreneurs should consider cooperating with a number of partners. By and large, our 
analysis showed that banks honor commitments of the potential entrepreneur, but are more 
doubtful about the credibility of signals on the repayment probability and the business 
success.  
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Figure 1: Possible commitments and signals of the entrepreneurs to mitigate bank’s fears 
 
 Commitments Signal 
Chance to recollect debt • collaterals • post-failure earning 
capacity 
Assessment of new business 
success chance 
• provision of costly and 
reliable information 
• investment of own 
resources 
• founder’s previous career 
• founder’s demographics 
• third party investments in 
business 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Used indicators for the possible commitments and signals 
 
 Commitments Signal 
Chance to recollect debt • home ownership • previous income 
• high education 
• age 
Assessment of new business 
success chance 
• business plan 
• advice from accountant 
 
• job similarity 
• previously self-employed 
• leadership experience 
• parental self-employment 
• married 
• children 
• foreign 
• single ownership 
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Table 1. Determinants of Denial Rates 
 
(Reported estimates are obtained from logit model, standard errors in parentheses) 
 
Home ownership    -1.01 (0.34)  1% 
 
High education     0.23 (0.32)   
 
HFL 25000 	  -0.22 (0.42) 
 
HFL 50000 	  -0.16 (0.44) 
 
HFL 75000 	 -0.35 (0.55) 
 
HFL 100000 	   -0.66 (0.59) 
 
Age      -0.07 (0.12) 
 
Age2       0.00 (0.00) 
 
Business plan     -0.82 (0.28)  1% 
 
Accountant     -0.71 (0.33)  5% 
 
Job similarity     -0.55 (0.27)  5% 
 
Previously self-employed    0.10 (0.34) 
 
Leadership      0.37 (0.29) 
 
Parental self-employment    0.02 (0.27) 
 
Married     -0.36 (0.39) 
 
Children      0.74 (0.39)  5% 
 
Foreign      1.12 (0.52)  5% 
 
Single ownership     0.57 (0.31)  10% 
 
N      347 
Pseudo R2     0.14 
Chi2      58.3 
Log likelihood    -178.31 
 
1%, 5% and 10% indicate the 1, 5 and 10 percent significance level or better. 
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Table 2. Determinants of Application Rates 
 
(Reported estimates are obtained from logit model, standard errors in parentheses)         
 
Home ownership     0.41 (0.19)  5% 
 
High education    -0.29 (0.16)  10% 
 
HFL 25000 	   0.53 (0.23)  5% 
 
HFL 50000 	   0.39 (0.24)  10% 
 
HFL 75000 	  0.61 (0.30)  5% 
 
HFL 100000 	    0.53 (0.31)  10% 
 
Age       0.02 (0.06) 
 
Age2      -0.00 (0.00) 
 
Business plan      1.10 (0.15)  1% 
 
Accountant      2.18 (0.24)  1% 
 
Job similarity      0.14 (0.15) 
 
Previously self-employed    0.22 (0.19) 
 
Leadership     -0.02 (0.16) 
 
Parental self-employment    0.25 (0.15)  10% 
 
Married     -0.03 (0.21) 
 
Children      0.14 (0.19) 
 
Foreign      0.37 (0.29)  
 
Single ownership    -0.28 (0.16)  10% 
 
N      1163 
Pseudo R2     0.17 
Chi2      235.03 
Log likelihood    -591.30 
 
1%, 5% and 10% indicate the 1, 5 and 10 percent significance level or better.  
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Appendix I : Descriptive statistics for individuals: 
 
     Who applied for credit Who considered becoming  
  self-employed 
 
Denied (=1 if bank denies full grant) 0.29      -- 
 
Apply (=1 if respondent applies for loan)  --    0.30  
 
Home ownership    0.74    0.69  
 
High education    0.34    0.38  
 
Income > HFL 25000    0.13    0.18  
 
HFL 25000 	  0.32    0.29  
 
HFL 50000 	  0.31    0.28  
 
HFL 75000 	 0.13    0.11  
 
HFL 100000 	   0.12    0.13  
 
Age      37    38  
 
Business plan     0.63    0.42  
 
Accountant     0.27    0.10  
 
Job similarity     0.50    0.45  
 
Previously self-employed   0.21    0.20  
 
Leadership     0.58    0.54  
 
Parental self-employment   0.40    0.35  
 
Married     0.79    0.77  
 
Children     0.67    0.66  
 
Foreign     0.06    0.06  
 
Single ownership    0.68    0.75  
 
Number of observations   347    1163 
 
The numbers in the table represent the means of the corresponding variables.  
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1
 Harris and Raviv (1991) and Hubbard (1998) provide excellent reviews of the literature on 
capital constraints due to agency problems and asymmetric information. 
 
2
 See Evans and Jovanovic (1989) for a static optimization problem. 
 
3
 In particular the structure of adjustment costs and type of stochastic shocks may complicate 
the optimization problem of an establishment substantially. 
 
4
 K* may be approximated by a linear quadratic Taylor expansion given some assumptions 
about which variables affect K*. Therefore we also include the square of age in our 
estimations. This is the only non-categorical variable in our analysis. 
 
5
 This definition of being credit constrained is consistent with the approach taken by 
Cavalluzzo and Cavalluzzo (1998), who also consider whether firms were able to receive full 
funding for the loan or not. 
 
6
 Japelli (1991) finds that married couples are less likely to be financially constrained 
consumers. 
 
7
 In signaling games, in equilibrium costly messages may reveal the type of the sender. See 
for instance Myers and Majluf (1984) and Gibbons (1992). 
   
8
  HFL (Hollandse Florijn) was the Dutch national currency (Dutch Guilder) at the time of the 
survey. HFL 1 equals approximately Euro 0.45. 
   
9
 Without reporting the precise estimates we like to note that our results regarding the other 
explanatory variables remain if we drop these two indicators. 
 
10
 It may be argued that the decision to apply for a loan and the decision to write a business 
plan or to consult an accountant coincide to a large extent. This may cause some endogeneity 
problems. Without reporting the estimates we note that exclusion of the variables “business 
plan” and “accountant” does not affect our results besides those concerning the variable 
measuring job similarity.  
 
